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Abstract
A step towards constructing an ethics of international activism is proposed by formulating a series
of constraints on what would constitute morally permissible agency in the context that involves
delivering services abroad, directly or indirectly. Perhaps surprisingly, in this effort the author
makes use of the concept of ‘force multiplier’. This idea and its official applications have explana-
tory importance in considering the correlation between the post-Cold War phenomenal growth in
the number of international non-governmental organizations and the emergence of the US as the
sole, unchallenged superpower. Four moral constraints useful for morally assessing international
activism are formulated and defended. The final outcome is an argument in favor of an overarching
duty for any activist-minded Westerner to go local, while developing nations are urged to closely
regulate, even criminalize, activities by international activists and ‘human rights organizations’ on
their territory when not in solidarity or in support of local movements. The position defended,
urging the normative primacy of local over international activism, also finds support in Immanuel
Kant’s Third Definitive Article for A Perpetual Peace.
Keywords: aid industry; aggression; altruism; force multipliers; international law;
human rights discourses; moral phenomenology; criminalization of international activism
International activism has grown into a veritable industry, particularly since the end
of the Cold War, making non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into major
players in the field of international development. Hence, the phrase ‘development
industry’ is ever more ubiquitous.1 According to a World Bank Key Document,
‘Working with NGOS’:2 ‘from 1970 to 1985 total development aid disbursed by
international NGOs increased ten-fold. In 1992, international NGOs channeled over
$7.6 billion of aid to developing countries. It is now estimated that over 15 percent of
total overseas development aid is channeled through NGOs.’ However, it is after the
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collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War that we witness a dramatic
upsurge in the activities of NGOs. Thus, ‘[t]he number of international NGOs alone
is reported to have increased from 6,000 in 1990 to 26,000 in 1999’, while ‘[t]he
OECD reports that in 2003, at least $12 billion was channeled into development
assistance through the international agencies.’3
The increasing power of NGOs, manifesting their ever mounting number in
operation and handling of ever more substantial quantities of money, raises questions
about the roles and responsibilities of these new global, non-state actors. In particular,
there is the question of developing an ethics of international activism that would
facilitate moral assessments of the endeavors by agents operating in countries other
than their own.
A step towards constructing the ethics of international activism taken here involves
a process of formulating a series of constraints on what would constitute morally
permissible agency in the context that involves delivering services abroad, directly or
indirectly. Also, perhaps surprisingly, in this effort I make use of the concept of ‘force
multiplier’. The content of this idea and its official applications have explanatory
importance in considering the correlation between the post-Cold War phenomenal
growth in the number of international NGOs and the emergence of the US as the
sole, unchallenged superpower ushering in the new ‘unipolar’ world.
Four constraints on morally permissible international activism will be proposed,
considered, and defended: (C1) The Professionalism Constraint; (C2); The Integrity
Constraint; (C3) The Respect for Sovereignty Constraint; and (C4) The Humility
Constraint. As soon as these constraints are understood and correctly analyzed, an
overarching principle emerges helping us realize that local activism must enjoy
normative primacy (in all three normative spheres: moral, legal, and political4) over
international activism. At the same time, this gives us an idea of how to conceive of
what could constitute legitimate international activism, i.e. one that respects the
primacy of local activism.
The thesis defended here about the normative primacy of local activism is neither
as radical nor as unprecedented as it might at first seem. It is easy to discover its
philosophical source, and hence derive further support for it in Kant’s Perpetual
Peace, in the form of claims that come close to an endorsement of the key moral
constraints that my primacy thesis is based on. I have in mind here Kant’s Third
Definitive Article For A Perpetual Peace: The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be
Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality. Explaining the Article Kant writes:
‘Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he
arrives in the land of another.’5 This appears to be the only line of Kant’s Third
Definitive Article that contemporary proponents of cosmopolitanism, perhaps guilty
of misappropriating Kant for their purposes, ever read. But there is more. In
particular, Kant is quite aware that ‘actions of the civilized’ when visiting the lands of
another can be exceedingly harmful for their kind hosts.
Kant cautions explicitly against the kinds of actions characteristic of those coming
from ‘our part of the world’, which is the same part of the world this essay focuses on
as the source of ‘international activism’, i.e. the Western world. ‘The injustice which
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they show to lands and peoples they visit (which is equivalent to conquering them) is
carried by them to terrifying lengths.’6 And Kant is capable of being very specific
about the injustice in question:
America, the lands inhabited by the Negro, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were
at the time of their discovery considered by these civilized intruders as lands without
owners, for they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In East India (Hindustan),
under the pretense of establishing economic undertakings, they brought in foreign
soldiers and used them to oppress the natives, excited widespread wars among the
various states, spread famine, rebellion, perfidy, and the whole litany of evils which
afflict mankind.7
Kant’s term ‘civilized intruders’ (as we shall see) comes awfully close to my term
(introduced below) ‘belligerent altruists’, and it is used in a very similar context to
our discussion in this essay, indicting those engaged in ‘civilizing missions’ abroad for
causing unspeakable evils while acting as force multipliers (a term to be defined
momentarily) for certain ‘commercial states of our part of the world’ as Kant puts it.
I will urge that as a protective measure against such evils potentially caused by
international activists we must adopt the thesis of the normative primacy of the local
activism. And what is Kant’s own proposal in this regard? He promotes exactly the
kind of regulation and criminalization (if need be) based on an idea very close to my
Respect for Sovereignty Constraint, and offering in approving terms very specific
examples: ‘China and Japan (Nippon), who have had experience with such guests,
have wisely refused them entry, the former permitting their approach to their shores
but not their entry, while the latter permit this approach to only one European
people, the Dutch, but treat them like prisoners, not allowing them any commu-
nication with the inhabitants.’8 With this in mind let us now turn to the task of
carefully introducing the moral constraints in question.
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISTS
We may think of international activists as altruists attracted by causes that originate
in foreign lands. Consequently, these are foreign altruists. By calling them ‘altruists’,
I do not intend to prejudge the actions of international activists as necessarily morally
good; I simply mean to indicate that they are ostensibly acting out of concern for the
welfare of others, in this case foreigners. This characterization is quite consistent with
rather confused and misguided activities stemming from one’s concern for the
wellbeing of others, even to the point that some altruistic acts may be judged as
morally bad*this may take the form of further victimizing those who are already
suffering as a result of, say, being victims in a civil strife. Furthermore, this does not
preclude a person from joining an organization that is part of the activism industry for
essentially selfish reasons: one may be moved on egoistic ground to make a living
from activism.
We can make further progress in delineating exactly who the ‘international
activists’ are by making more precise this notion of ‘causes that originate in foreign
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lands’. Most frequently those causes are expressed in terms of global protection, and
respect for human rights. Thus, Amnesty International defines itself a ‘a worldwide
movement of people who campaign for internationally recognized human rights to be
respected and protected for everyone’,9 while Human Rights Watch states that it ‘is
dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.’10
Additional clarity is achieved when we realize that governments can also show
interest in those same causes expressed in terms of human rights, but we would not
count government administrators, operating in their official capacities, among
‘international activists’. Thus, The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
of the US government, states that ‘protecting human rights around the world [is]
central to US foreign policy’,11 yet we would not consider State Department officials
‘international activists’. This is why organizations that want to count as groupings of
international activists are quick to assert their independence. Thus Human Rights
Watch promptly in its self-description emphasizes that it is ‘one of the world’s leading
independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights’,12
while Amnesty International makes the same claim using more precise language
affirming that they are ‘independent of any government, political ideology, economic
interest or religion’.13 Consequently, international activists are not meant to be
government officials, ideologues, corporate lobbyists, or missionaries on behalf of
any religion; in fact, international activists are supposed to operate independently of
any government, ideology, corporation, and religion. In the first instance, this then
poses strong constraints on how to construe an ethics of international activism:
(C1) It is considered morally impermissible for international activists to act on
behalf of any government, ideology, corporation, or religion.
Let us call this the Professionalism Constraint. It stands to reason that if a person is
genuinely motivated by the welfare of others from a country other than her own, then
she must not be acting on behalf of her (or any other) government, should not
promote any ideology (be it political, economic or otherwise), nor proselytize in favor
of a religion. Thus, for example, international activists must not propagate in favor of
a regime change in a country where such policy is pursued by, say, the US
government; they must not engage in promoting the economic ideology of free
market and privatization in, say, a country with the socialist economic system (or any
other); or attempt to convert, say, local Muslim population to Christianity. This
much can therefore be asserted with sufficient moral clarity to make our first
constraint on an ethics of international activism fairly straightforward and uncon-
troversial. It is another matter, in fact an empirical question, whether activists from
Western countries in general manage to live up to this moral requirement.
FORCE MULTIPLIERS
If our goal is to both construct a framework for an ethics of international activism,
through a process of formulating applicable moral constraints on what constitutes
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permissible conduct in this context, and engage in the making of concrete moral
judgments about actual endeavors that take place throughout the world, then we must
also pay attention to the existing vocabulary of the ‘aid discourse’. In other words, for
our effort to be both theoretical (developing an aspect of moral philosophy) and
practical (using the conceptual tools for normative judgment making), it is important
to keep track of the relevant real-life experiences, in the best tradition of applied ethics.
The concept
This brings us to the second notion I propose to utilize in building the ethics of
international activism: force multiplier. It is a military term, defined as follows: ‘A
capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly
increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of
successful mission accomplishment.’14
Readers might be tempted to think, at this point, that something must have gone
terribly wrong. Isn’t the notion of ‘force multiplier’ obviously inconsistent with
the contents of our first constraint, the Professionalism Constraint, on morally
permissible domain of activities by international activists? How could this latter idea
even be contemplated in connection to international activism? Yet the link exists, and
it is a very strong one, as Colin L. Powell makes clear:
As I speak, just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out
there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom . . . I am serious about
making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force
multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team . . . [We are] all
committed to the same, singular purpose to help humankind, to help every man and
woman in the world who is in need, who is hungry, who is without hope, to help
every one of them fill a belly, get a roof over their heads, educate their children, have
hope, give them the ability to dream about a future that will be brighter, just as we
have tried to make the future brighter for all Americans.15
Should these remarks by Colin Powell be taken seriously? One might be tempted not
to read too much into the use of military jargon by a former general, turned Secretary
of State. Could this be just fac¸on de parler appropriate for the occasion? Surely, that
would be a relief, but research shows that both professional international activists
themselves, and other government officials endorse the idea of international activists
being force multipliers. The embrace is apparently mutual.
International activists recognize their role
Rony Brauman, an early member and a former president of Doctors Without Borders/
Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF), which in 1999 received the Nobel Peace Prize,
nicely documents the full embrace by international activists of their role as force
multipliers in Iraq. Brauman tells us that in the wake of the aggression against Iraq most
NGOs in the United States ‘accepted government funding, refrained from judgment
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on the forthcoming war, and held themselves ready to intervene in Iraq when the time
came.’ This meant that NGOs (particularly American) ‘chose to be financed by their
governments for the Iraq intervention accepted to reduce their role to that of sub-
contractor to a belligerent party.’ Explaining what led to this most curious direct
alliance between a ‘coalition of the willing’ militaries attacking a sovereign country and
international activists, Brauman bluntly avers: ‘This tendency has been exacerbated in
Iraq by the US government’s increased use of private profit-making companies to
undertake functions that were formerly the exclusive preserve of NGOs. Many NGOs
fear that they will lose out to private companies, which are already claiming larger
amounts of the ‘‘NGO market’’, and hence prefer to play the role requested of them to
preserve their ‘‘market share.’’’16
In contrast, in this context, between the two kinds of institutions Brauman admits, ‘it
is difficult to see differences between public and private institutions other than
administrative ones.’ Consequently, a job with an ‘international’ NGO is a job, just as a
job with a private company is a job, and in this case both are contracting with the US
government and the US military. The mentioned administrative difference between
NGOs and private firms may also engender a difference in accountability, since private
companies must operate in a way that always keeps their shareholders in mind while
NGOs are not exactly accountable to anyone. Perhaps this can even generate a question
why then have NGOs involved at all in projects of reconstruction and aid delivery?
The standard view of NGOs as more inclined than state or private organizations to
work in ‘difficult political environments’ can be offered as a potential answer to this
question. This widely held view about NGOs is an empirical matter, however. And it
was only recently a subject of an empirical study with a startling outcome that ‘NGO
aid increases with rising levels of democracy.’ The study concludes: ‘ . . . we do not
find evidence supporting the hypothesis that NGOs complement official aid through
engaging in the so-called difficult institutional environments where state aid agencies
find it difficult to reach needy citizens. It rather appears that NGOs tend to replicate
the location choices of official ‘backdonors’ from whom NGOs get part of their
funding. This casts doubt on the notion of autonomous NGO behavior. Moreover,
NGOs follow other NGOs that may add to the divide between the so-called donor
darlings and donor orphans. Finally, NGOs prefer recipient countries with common
traits related to religion or colonial history.’17 If, in other words, NGOs are
‘bunching’ in places where state (or private) aid organizations are likely to operate,
thus duplicating the work that would be going on anyway, we are back to the
difference in accounting as the only relevant one for what we are considering here,
and if doubt is cast on ‘the notion of autonomous NGO behavior’ this makes that
much more compelling the idea that they are in fact acting as force multipliers.
The ‘revolving doors’ phenomenon
Another point of too close a contact between international activism and government
is apparent in the phenomenon we may call ‘revolving doors’ between the elites of the
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international activism industry and ‘service’ at the US State Department. As the latest
example we could use Michael Posner, the current Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. He came to this position after 30 years of
being ‘at the forefront of the international human rights movement’, in the words of
Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, at his swearing in ceremony.18 Posner, a
former Executive Director, at the time of the current appointment had been
President of the Human Rights First, an international human rights organization
founded in 1977. Nothing screams ‘force multiplier’ louder than the ‘revolving
doors’ phenomenon: yesterday’s human rights activist is today’s government official,
and tomorrow the cycle will begin again. And what is Mr. Posner’s newest job
exactly? According to Madam Secretary: ‘Day in and day out, the bureau that Mike
is heading works to promote some of our most basic values. It trains NGOs and civil
society leaders to try to turn the principles of democracy into practice, to combat
violence and discrimination against women and minorities, to promote interfaith
dialogue and fight exploitation in the workplace. We really count on DRL to ensure
that people around the world enjoy the rights and responsibilities and the
opportunities that should enable them to make better decisions for themselves.’19
Hence, an activist, a president of an international human rights organization, is
hired by the government to train ‘NGOs and civil society leaders’ to be good force
multipliers for the government. It is curious that Human Right First, while sending
its president to ‘serve’ as Assistant Secretary of State finds it necessary to state
in its self-description the following: ‘To maintain our independence, we accept no
government funding.’20 Yet, an astute observer of NGO industry has remarked that
despite the frequency of such self-serving statements by NGOs: ‘NGOs not
dependent on state aid are the exception rather than the rule.’21 Good faith readers
might wonder why understand the revolving doors phenomenon as a suggestion that
international activists*or at least those who have been for decades on the forefront
of the human rights ‘movement’*are in fact endorsing their role of force multipliers?
Is it not possible to be a good professional in whatever role one operates, as
international activist or government official?
To recognize that this question must be answered in the negative, one need not be
in bad faith towards either the international activists or any government, even less a
conspiracy theorist. The reason is simple: there is no sufficient difference between
government trained ‘NGOs and civil society leaders’ and government itself: both are
part of the same ‘foreign policy elite’; it is a distinction without a difference. This
point is nicely explained with respect to Human Rights Watch in the study ‘Who is
Behind Human Rights Watch?’:
For a century there has been a strong interventionist belief in the
United States*although it competes with widespread isolationism. In recent years
attitudes hardened: human-rights interventionism became a consensus among the
‘foreign policy elite’ even before September 11. Human Rights Watch itself is part
of that elite, which includes government departments, foundations, NGO’s and
academics. It is certainly not an association of ‘concerned private citizens.’ HRW
board members include present and past government employees, and overlapping
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directorates22 link it to the major foreign policy lobbies in the US. Cynically
summarised, Human Rights Watch arose as a joint venture of George Soros and the
State Department. Nevertheless, it represents some fundamental characteristics of
US-American culture.23
While this passage, using the example of Human Rights Watch, illustrates very well the
revolving doors phenomenon, it also introduces a third player*the big money or the
financial community*involved in shaping the monolithic ‘foreign policy elite’,
personified by the multibillionaire speculator George Soros. This trinity (perhaps,
the unholy trinity) of government, financial community, and NGOs, raises further the
interesting question as to who in the end might be whose ‘force multiplier’? In
particular, could it be, for example, that while international activists are force
multipliers for the US government, the government itself is a force multiplier for the
financial community? For the moment I shall not pursue this morally (and politically)
highly relevant question, but just posing it can serve as a way to introduce a wider point
about the revolving doors phenomenon.
The economist Joseph F. Stiglitz, who was awarded a Nobel Prize for his work,
identified, in not too distinct a context, another ‘revolving doors’ problem. Trying to
account for the failure, in line with its original mandate and objectives, of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in securing global economic stability in the
1980s and 1990s, Stiglitz postulates that a quiet but unsubtle change in mandate and
objectives had occurred. The IMF has been pursuing the interests of the financial
community. Key to understanding this change is another instance of revolving doors:
One of my main criticisms of IMF is that, in certain central ways, though it is a
public institution, it does not conform to what we have come to expect of public
institutions. In Western democracies, for instance, there is a basic right to know,
reflected, for example, in America’s Freedom of information Act. There is no such
basic right at the international economic institutions. In America and in most other
western democracies, there is a concern about ‘‘revolving doors’’*individuals
moving too quickly from public institutions to well-paid private ones closely
connected with their public service.24
The example Stiglitz provides is Stanley Fisher, the First Deputy Managing Director
of the IMF (19942001), who played a significant role in achieving capital market
liberalization that neither helped the welfare of the poor countries nor did it provide
stability of the global economy, but it did open up vast new markets for Wall Street.
Noting that Fisher went directly from the IMF to become a vice chairman at
Citigroup Stiglitz pondered: ‘One could only ask, Was Fisher being richly rewarded
for having faithfully executed what he was told to do?’25
Government officials on ‘force multipliers’
In reality, we should not be surprised if Colin Powell were not the only government
official who sees international activists (and others) as the government’s force
multipliers. Consider, for example, the words of the current Secretary of Defense,
A. Jokic
46
(page number not for citation purpose)
Robert M. Gates, during a recent testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee: ‘From the military’s perspective, virtually any campaign we undertake
today or in the near future is unlikely to succeed without civilian involvement and
expertise. As we have seen with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other
efforts, including even a few properly placed civilian experts, has become what the
military calls a ‘force multiplier’. Past experiences have also shown that military
campaigns and contingency plans improve greatly with civilian input’.26 Gates’ way
of using the word ‘civilians’ to refer to force multipliers could equally refer to private
contractors or international NGO activists. Both have been used by the Pentagon in
Iraq reconstruction in a way that pitted these groups one against the other as
competitors, the only difference, as explained by Brauman, the Nobel Laureate
international activist himself, being the style of ‘administration’.
Even US Presidents are not immune from seeking force multipliers among those
whose altruistic impulses take them to engage ostensibly on behalf of those ‘less
fortunate’ in foreign countries. Thus, in his Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)
on peacekeeping policies and programs, President William J. Clinton envisages using
the UN as ‘force multiplier’: ‘Circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral
action best serves US interests in preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the
UN can be an important instrument for collective action. UN peace operations can
also provide a ‘‘force multiplier’’ in our efforts to promote peace and stability’.27
Curiously, however, this PDD is issued in the midst of the horrific ‘100 day large-
scale massacres’ in Rwanda, the start of which were marked by the crippling
reduction of UN peace keeping troops at the request of the then US Ambassador to
the UN Madeleine Albright. Where the UN had the right (and arguably, the
obligation) to act at the height of the armed conflict and massacres, under US
pressure, it did not; yet the real ‘force multiplier’ turned out, evidently, to be the same
Madeleine Albright’s push to have the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
established in late 1994, once it was too late to act in any way other than to reinforce
and legitimize the military leadership of Paul Kagame.28
Finally, to illustrate the fully bipartisan nature of the US foreign policy, we can
witness the infatuation with the idea of using the UN as ‘force multiplier’ from the
political right in the form of a statement by a fellow of Heritage Foundation Steven
Groves. For him the real question ‘is not whether UN peacekeepers could possibly
be a ‘‘force multiplier’’ for US armed forces, but rather whether and under
what circumstances UN peacekeeping serves the vital, national interests of the
United States’.29 While, admittedly, there may be little meaningful difference
between the UN serving as force multiplier for US armed forces and UN serving
the vital, national interests of the US both ideas appear incongruous with the very
nature of the institution the UN had been envisaged to be.
There is something obviously disturbing in the suggestion that international
activists or the UN workers should serve as force multipliers for the US armed forces
in the variety of theaters of operations where the latter are continuously active. This
stands in direct opposition to the definitional component of ‘international activism’
as agency that stems from concern for the welfare of others in foreign countries.
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The integrity of their actions is threatened if international activists operate in concert
with US armed forces or for the sake of US government while ostensibly engaged to
address basic needs of less fortunate humans in other countries. Consequently, an
explicit moral constraint defining the way international activists can satisfy the
requirements of minimal integrity of their actions is necessary. Call it the Integrity
Constraint:
(C2) It is considered morally impermissible for international activists to serve as
force multipliers for U.S. armed forces or U.S. government (or any other such
political or military organization).
It is perhaps clear that the Integrity Constraint is implied by our Professionalism
Constraint. However, given the aggressive push by US officials to employ inter-
national activists as force multipliers, the impact of the phenomenon of revolving
doors, and the apparent happy acquiescence by many (Western) international
activists to their newly given (post-Cold War) role, it is important to make the
Integrity Constraint explicit.
THE PARADOX OF TWO HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES
The concept of ‘human rights’ is most widely employed to capture the causes for
international activism (the second most popular being ‘democratization’30). These
are expressed, as we have seen, in terms of an effort to achieve global protection, and
respect for human rights. Yet we can clearly distinguish two very different human
rights discourses the functions of which are diametrically opposed. The first,
developed in the wake of World War II, recognizes, together with the UN Charter
and the Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgment, that aggression is the supreme interna-
tional crime,31 while the second that emerged after 1989, serves to ‘legitimize’
aggression (by some states) and attempts to decriminalize it. Keeping in mind the
historical context in which human rights discourse had emerged and its subsequent
acquisition of a completely novel function can help us formulate yet another moral
constraint on what would constitute proper conduct by international activists, as well
as locate the exact circumstance when Western international activists were effectively
turned into force multipliers.
Human rights for ‘soft’ intervention
To understand a particular human rights discourse one must grasp its political stakes
in a historical context. Hence, if we focus on the moment of the original push in favor
of promoting a (contemporary) conception of international human rights, we see that
it emerges in the wake of atrocities committed against non-combatants during
WWII, along with the concept of genocide (inspired by the plight of the European
Jews during the Shoah, or what is known as the Holocaust mostly in North America),
and the idea that aggression is the supreme crime in international law. This trio of
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normative concepts, although applicable equally to the moral, legal, and political
contexts, was destined, according to the vision of that time, to become the
cornerstones of the post-war international law. However, the human rights discourse
capable of incorporating all three ideas in a coherent way lasted only until the end of
Cold War, at which point a tension emerged between the uses of the notion of
‘human rights’ (as well as that of ‘genocide’32) and the idea that aggression must
remain the supreme crime in international law.
Decolonization was the most significant social phenomenon to which the
internationally articulated human rights were applied in the period after WWII
and before the end of Cold War. In this context, the human rights discourse served a
dual role of helping local activists challenge repression by their own governments
and, more importantly, argue against occupation by foreign imperialists and colonial
powers. The projects of liberation from overseas colonial domination, unfolding on
several continents from the late 1960s through the 80s, with the accompanying
human rights discourse served to underscore the importance of the principles of self-
determination and sovereign equality. While in no way representing a crucial force or
inspiration for decolonization the invocation of human rights by local activists and
external actors in this period did have a significant supporting role.33 This is nicely
described by Jean L. Cohen whose words are worth quoting in extenso:
Despite being largely exhortatory, the human rights declarations and covenants
were an important normative referent for domestic civil society and social
movement activists. They helped legitimate justice-based and democracy-oriented
demands for political change, authorizing and empowering citizen movements to
claim rights against their own governments and to demand their legal and
constitutional institutionalization. The official role of external actors was restricted to
‘‘soft’’ forms of intervention. Although human rights campaigns involved linkages
between domestic and transnational ‘‘activists beyond borders,’’ the emphasis was
on local agency, on facilitating the emergence of internal actors, and the
organization and institutionalization of their learning experiences. Local activists
seeking liberation and democratization articulated and contributed to human rights
discourses, while transnational NGOs helped via investigations and exposes, enabling
domestic actors to shame their governments into conforming to the rule of law. In this
context human rights discourses, the idea of a domestic entitlement and
participation in the multilateral institutions, did not appear to threaten either the
popular sovereignty/self-determination of citizens or the external sovereignty of
states. The political agency of local actors and movements was the main vehicle for
denouncing domestic injustice and for giving ‘‘ethical-political’’ meaning to the
universal principles they were invoking, their very praxis revealing that the content
of basic rights would be determined domestically.34
The principal features of the human rights discourse in this period, hence, had a
supportive role in the decolonization struggle by empowering local actors without
threatening either domestic legitimacy or external sovereignty of states while
restricting external actors only to ‘soft’ forms of intervention. Alternatively stated,
the point is that the human rights discourse and the discourse of sovereignty were at
the time seen as entirely consistent and mutually reinforcing, and both springing from
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the sovereignty-based model of international law. Consequently, within this form of
human rights discourse, the proper domain of engagement by international activists,
including those hailing from the West, is to offer solidarity with and support for pre-
existing domestic movements, and certainly not to attempt to structure let alone
originate and shape civil society in other countries.
Human rights for imperial aggression
Since the end of Cold War we have witnessed a most dramatic shift in human rights
discourse and practice accompanied with a demand for abandoning the discourse of
sovereignty as a ‘relic of a bygone era’ allegedly no longer applicable in the context of
the new brave, unipolar world. Suddenly the ideal of protecting human rights
assumed primacy over international law and the discourse of state sovereignty on
which it is based; the latter are no longer seen as representing converging values with
human rights. On the contrary, the legalistic discourse of sovereignty was standing in
the way of ‘justified’ rescue missions confronting gross human rights violations
throughout the world. New ‘norms’ expressed in terms of human rights had to be
envisaged to take the place of sovereignty in international law, which has outlived its
historical relevance in a world so different from its Westphalian origin. The purpose
was to replace the human rights declarations from being mere moral exhortations
into hard ‘globalized law’ put in place of traditional international law, the idea being
that new forms of ‘transnational governance’ have already replaced unitary states as
key actors in the global political system; given the ‘disaggregation’ of the state and its
sovereignty*the basis of ‘old’ international law*new globalized law is emerging on
the basis of the post-Westphalian World Order that is allegedly already in place.35
Proposals were made in favor of a basic human right to security, a fundamental right
to protection, a principle of civilian inviolability, even a human right to democracy
seen as popular sovereignty that trumps state sovereignty.36 What is more, arguments
in favor of violations of international law were conjured up as the only means of
updating it; reform of international law comes as a result of its violations that have
good consequences.37
As a result, human rights have become veritable weapons in the arsenal of US
foreign policy and successfully imposed on the practice by ‘allied’ countries (while
others are not permitted to use human rights in a similar fashion). This novel
application of human rights deployed for the sake of punitive actions is again well
summarized by Jean L. Cohen:
Since the end of the cold war, human rights violations have been invoked as a
justification for the imposition of debilitating sanctions, military invasions, and
authoritarian occupation administrations by multilateral organizations and/or states
acting unilaterally, under the rubric of ‘‘humanitarian intervention’’ justified as
‘‘enforcement’’ of international human rights law. Indeed the claim that a human
right to democracy is crystallizing into a legal entitlement under customary
international law has led some to insist that this right legitimates the use of force
in pro-democratic invasions either to restore or spread democracy, and to argue for
A. Jokic
50
(page number not for citation purpose)
conditioning the international legal recognition of states on their observance of
‘‘basic’’ human rights including a right to ‘‘minimal’’ democracy. The new emphasis
on human security in human rights discourses coupled with paternalistic inter-
pretations of human rights law in a global context increasingly defined as an ‘‘age
of terrorism’’ tends to restrict rather than enhance the political agency and
human rights of domestic actors struggling against injustice and to sacrifice
self-determination and sovereign equality on the altar of global security policies.38
Debilitating sanctions,39 military invasions, authoritarian occupations, and humani-
tarian bombing campaigns all in the name of human rights, and endorsed by
international activists represent a part of the legacy of the latest discourse on human
rights. This legacy appears to invert the concept to the point where protection of
human rights comes into conflict with the characterization of aggression as the
supreme crime in international law, and resolves it at the expense of the later. The
outcome is decriminalization of aggression.40
Belligerent altruism
The phrase ‘belligerent altruism’ is of course an oxymoron. Yet, we did define
activism in terms of altruism, and those who call for aggression by a superpower
against other, weaker states are clearly belligerent.41 The new practice by human
rights organizations to call for governments to use their ‘police powers’ to intervene
in other states in the name of morality is termed by one author humanrightism: a
transformation of human rights into its own travesty, which ‘inverts the concept,
from one premised on the protection of people from the violence of states, to one
justifying the application of violence by the world’s most powerful states against
weaker ones’.42 This amounts to an instrumentalization of the concept of human
rights (and indeed of international law) for the sake of an imperial project.
We can locate the context in which this instrumentalization most vividly took place
as one that involves the US-led aggression by NATO against Yugoslavia in the spring
of 1999. This is the moment when international activists became force multipliers (or
belligerent altruists) for the Empire. This dramatic transformation is relevantly
described in a brave article by Dimitrina Petrovna, Executive Director of the
European Roma Rights Center in Budapest as presented by Robert Hayden:43
Petrovna acknowledges that she herself was in favor of NATO intervention in
Kosovo until she saw, soon after the bombing began, that it was escalating the
human rights catastrophe for everyone in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, inside
Kosovo and in Serbia, and that ‘‘from a campaign to defend the lives and rights of
Kosovo Albanians, [the war] metamorphosed into something else: the monster of
an escalated war.’’ While Petrovna herself then called for an immediate end to the
bombing and a negotiated peace, few others in the human rights community did so.
She notes that for east European human rights workers, their very status and
funding could have been jeopardized by criticism of NATO and especially the
US*NATO countries are, after all, the major financiers of more than just ICTY. In
the Western countries themselves, however, the reasons are more troubling. There,
she notes, ‘‘human rights are becoming indistinguishable from official political
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ideology, ‘‘producing’’ a gradual usurpation of human-rights culture by the
dominant powers, and the very argument for human rights is turning into an
apologia for the global status quo, all in the interests of these very powers.’’44
Once human rights become ‘indistinguishable from official political ideology’, once
human rights culture is usurped by the dominant powers, and once the argument for
human rights is turned into an apologia for the imperial project by the sole
superpower while this transformation is not protested but supported by international
activists in the Western countries, this gives us a clear sense of international activists
serving as force multipliers or being ‘belligerent altruists’. However, the tension
captured by this term must be resolved, and this brings us to the next constraint on
the morally permissible character of international activism. In order to accomplish
this we must remove the belligerent character of the post-Cold War practice by
human rights organizations. We must council a return to the human rights discourse
that respects sovereignty of nation states and permits at most ‘soft’ intervention while
opposing all attempts at decriminalizing aggression and making sure that activists are
not aiding and abetting aggression under any circumstances. This could be called the
Respect for Sovereignty Constraint:
(C3) It is considered morally impermissible for international activists to disrespect
sovereignty, aid and abet aggression, and engage in anything beyond ‘soft’
intervention.
It may perhaps appear that this constraint is equivalent to the Integrity Constraint
and also implied by the Professionalism Constraint. Yet it seems obvious that by
explicitly stating and providing the background and justification for the Respect for
Sovereignty Constraint we achieve additional clarity about the confines of morally
permissible behavior by activists in foreign lands.
THE MORAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM
To advance further with our goal of developing an ethics of international activism
that would facilitate moral assessments of their endeavors, we will engage in moral
phenomenology of international activism. Moral phenomenology is the study of the
experiential aspects of moral life. By investigating ‘what it is like’ to undergo mental
states that instantiate phenomenal properties when, say, judging that one ‘must
engage’ we might be able to formulate further moral constraints that can guide our
moral evaluation of what international activists do. The idea is that the construction
of constraints on moral permissibility of acting qua international activist can be aided
via compelling phenomenological descriptions of specific experiential episodes.
Sacrificial nature of activism45
Moral assessment of activism in general and international activism in particular
is very hard to undertake, primarily because it is taken in advance as something good.
A. Jokic
52
(page number not for citation purpose)
It is presumably a self-sacrificing, unselfish activity on behalf of another. What is
there to morally evaluate if it apparently leaves no room for anything but good? This
appearance of being something unquestionably good is, as we shall see, both
activism’s advantage and its curse. It is an advantage because it offers a particularly
satisfying and comforting aura of moral excellence to those who decide to engage,
but it is a curse also because it is a phenomenon that provides wide opportunities for
political and other manipulation and abuse, including turning activists into force
multipliers.
In describing activists, what readily comes to mind are phrases like ‘well-meaning’,
‘ready to sacrifice’, or ‘peace-loving’. This means that their motivation is experienced
as not only good in the ordinary sense that the activity in question is in itself good, or
taken to be good, but that it is good because the objectives guiding the action, e.g.
peace, de-nuclearization or human rights, are themselves conceived as unquestionably
good. This motivation stems from the activists’ increased sensitivity to evil that exists
in the world. Without that sensitivity, or the particular way of experiencing adversity
suffered by others, there would be no engagement in the first place. Their motives,
therefore, are not only good when in retrospect their actions are to be assessed, but
the motivation is good in a deeper sense that its very source is experienced as being
the good itself (or opposition to and distaste for evil as such). Their motivation is not
contingently good, but it is necessarily so, for it is aimed at and focused toward the
good. Evil is not only something merely negative, but some among us can experience
it as something simply unbearable. Those individuals are, therefore, unable to just
contemplate, attempt to understand, or just perceive evil, they must actively engage
in eradicating it.
This (tacitly assumed) account of motivation is at the bottom of activists’
preoccupation with matters that strictly speaking are of no direct concern to them.
For, the activist is not fighting to gain something for herself; she is engaged because
she cannot stand evil suffered by others (call this, the felt foreign or external evil).
The per assumption absence of the activist’s direct interest in the matters of her
engagement shows that this peculiar impetus that gets her going must be purely moral
in nature. This is exactly what defines the (international) activist’s position. We must
note, however, that in order for activists to act on behalf of others (or on behalf of the
ideal they are fighting for), i.e. engage in the fight against evil, they must do two
things according to this definition. They must not only have no (direct) interest
(beneficial to themselves) in the final aims of their activities, but at the same time
they must neglect their own (direct) interests, those that they ordinarily have or that
they might have developed had they not become engaged. Without suppressing the
latter kind of interests activists would have no room (or time) for these, per
assumption, external interests. Consequently, success of activism involves sacrifice.
The position of sacrifice poses a significant obstacle to any form of serious
assessment. It is particularly difficult to undertake moral evaluation or criticism of
the activities by such engage´ individuals, who are prepared to set aside their own
direct interests and concerns in order to act on behalf of others. What would this sort
of assessment be like, particularly if it were negative? It would have to point at some
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deficiency or inadequacy in the activist’s endeavor; perhaps it is not quite astutely
channeled, it might be insufficiently energetic, persistent or comprehensive, etc. But
these kinds of assessments seem to be directly in conflict with the nature of the
activist’s motivational structure: she is acting as a result of being in an agitated state,
because something is disturbing to her, something is disgusting her, and she cannot
stand it. All this presupposes, however, that the judgment, which is a source of these
feelings, must be extremely strong; that it possesses a certain form of definiteness
that could not be there without the highest level of persuasion that the judgment in
question must be right. There appears to be no room for humility here.
The intense motivational capacity of this attitude is grounded precisely in the
intensity of the persuasion regarding the greatness of the value in question, which is
under attack in some sense. This could be something as simple as the quantity of evil
perpetrated in some place (near or far away) against which she, the activist, has
decided to fight simply because she cannot stand it occurring! In such a context,
which from the first-person experience appears to provide certainty of the validity of
conviction, to attempt to put in question in any way the activist’s unselfish and in
many regards, good acts (e.g. courageousness, determination, etc.) means in advance
to place oneself in a position of disadvantage.
Is the experience of conviction enough?
A picture emerges according to which, for the activist, given the axiological nature of
the cause for which she is fighting, all that is required to set her on the right path is
that she be sincere and firm in her decision. Are there no obstacles to getting the
purpose right, to honing in on what is unquestionably the right goal for which to
make personal sacrifices? What could be the source of such infallible knowledge or
the experience that appears as if one is in the possession of it? These are appropriate
questions! For, the activist possesses not only a firm conviction that the cause is right,
but also a persuasion that no consideration could possibly put it in question. The
position is tantamount to a person who has all the answers in advance, with no need
to engage in the search for evidence. It is a position that readily presents answers,
while the procedure that supplied them remains forever hidden, unexplored, and
insignificant. Does this, therefore, mean that it isn’t, strictly speaking, important
what will really be achieved (as in the saying ‘Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth’),
but that whatever is accomplished is good enough*in the sense of being sufficient
and not open to moral assessment other than automatic praise? Put differently, since
the activist’s motivation procures the act’s rightness and its goodness, does this mean
that there is no possible question to be raised here? Or, that no argumentation of any kind
is required or possible in this case? The last remark indicates an ideological character
of the situation*we are trading in a context wherein reasons do not function in their
customary fashion, or not at all. This appears to make activism akin to ideology.
Ideologies function precisely in this way: no reasons are presented, no argumenta-
tion offered, everything is already settled (prior to any questioning). What is more,
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attempting to ascertain the real nature of anything*when this is done from an
independent point of view, i.e. from the perspective that fails to predetermine it with
respect to the basic (ideological) tenet as concordant or perhaps not*is viewed as a
way of putting in question what is already clear (and accepted)! Ideologies, as is well
known, incorporate no debate, no argumentation, and no uncertainty. What we do
find is that all reasons have already been ‘distributed’: some are favorable (and hence
they are the ‘right’ ones) while others are not (in which case they are either ‘wrong’
or, worse, a dangerous attempt at deception). Once inside an ideology one seems to
have no room for humility with respect to the rightness of the main ideological tenets,
or the pertinent description of the ideological summum bonum. Are things the same
with respect to activism?
Ideology, of course, is oriented towards generating a following and agreement. It
is not truth-focused or discovery-oriented. Hence, the accompanying felt certainty
that characterizes activists’ or ideologues’ attitudes towards the contents of their
judgments about the rightness or appropriateness of the goals they set themselves or
conceptions of the ultimate good they adopt cannot be characterized as infallible.
Consequently, quite contrary to the findings of our rudimentary study of the
experiential aspects of the activists’ moral life, which suggest that conviction should
be enough to secure the non-impeachability of activists’ actions, there exist good
reasons to urge the attitude of activist humility.
The requirement of humility
This brief discussion of the moral phenomenology of international activism, which
likens it to ideology indicates that the principal danger international activists face is
their vulnerability to cooption by big powers through usurpation of the main
(ideological) tenets that define the summum bonum on behalf of which they act. In
light of the Professionalism Constraint international activists are morally required to
prevent such cooption and usurpation, but the ideological nature of activism
substantially reduces the resistance capacity by activists in this respect. Hence, it
should not be surprising that they end up converted into force multipliers with such
ease. However, there is a defense available to them that could enhance their integrity
and consists in the practice of humility. If activists avoid the attitude of epistemic
arrogance with respect to the normative value of the cause they act to support, if they
refuse to take their own comfort and conviction regarding the value of their cause as a
sure mark of its unquestionable validity, they may have a way of protecting the moral
purity of their engagement. This takes us to the final constraint in this exercise, to the
Humility Constraint:
(C4) It is considered morally impermissible for international activists to take the
strength of their conviction as a sufficient condition for the validity of their
endeavor.
The requirement of humility contained in the constraint (C4) if followed would
ensure that the occasional reviews of one’s agency, accompanying goals and
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conception of value would prevent such perversions as the above discussed
transformation of international activism into belligerent altruism.
THE JUDGMENT
In light of the moral constraints, C1C4, presented and defended here, the
overwhelmingly negative assessment of contemporary international activism is
painfully obvious. If so, the question emerges, what must, morally speaking, be
done about it? This question would have to be answered both from the perspective of
the activists and those who find themselves on the receiving end of these would-be-
good-but-bad-Samaritans.46 It behooves me to be brief on this matter.
From the perspective of the Western activists, we should advise the following. Just
as the old American saying goes that ‘all politics is local’ so all activism should be
local. In fact, the overarching duty for any activist-minded Westerner may be to go
local and acknowledge the primacy of local activism, and thus deprive the
imperialist project of an important body of force multipliers. On the other hand,
if activities and projects by international activists hailing from the West cannot be
deemed morally permissible, this should have legal consequences in the nations
where Western activists are likely to operate. Understandably, those countries ought
to strictly regulate*and in appropriate cases, criminalize*activities by interna-
tional activists and ‘human rights organizations’ on their territory when they are not
in solidarity or in support of local movements. Paradoxically, the justification for
this criminalization is grounded precisely in the real concern for the human rights of
the inhabitants from those countries.
A clarification is in order at this point. When I state that all activism should be
local this is not meant to preclude legitimate international activism. What I mean is
to insist on the primacy of local activism in the sense that all international activism
must recognize this primacy, and hence reduce itself to a supporting role. In short,
the legitimate international activism engages in solidarity and support of local
movements. Recognizing this primacy of the local aspect of activism can be seen as
the main condition of legitimacy for any international activism.
Finally, returning to Kant, to close this section of the essay we shall consider
specific cases, emulating Kant himself: it is clear that Kant would have, for
example, approved of the actions by Chinese authorities who, 2 weeks before
Tiananmen events, in June 1989 had expelled Gene Sharp and his assistant, Bruce
Jenkins. Kant would have also supported Ukrainian border authorities denying
entry in October 2004 to Aleksandar Maric, a member of Otpor (meaning
‘resistance’), Serbian ‘dissident’ groups funded by the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED), who was on his way to help train members of PORA (meaning
‘it’s time’), the Ukrainian version of Otpor. Both examples are connected with
the US post-Cold War practice of engineering ‘democracy’ abroad through the
ballot box and civil disobedience in pursuit of distinct foreign policy goals. The
technique of using non-violence to effect regime change by destabilizing targeted
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governments (as part of traditional military strategy) was developed by theoretician
Gene Sharp.47
The conceptual apparatus and normative framework developed in this essay can
assist us in diagnosing in a precise way what is wrong (morally speaking) with Gene
Sharp’s ‘strategic non-violent action’. In short, Sharp’s design that uses non-violence
as a form of warfare*adopted by foreign policy makers in the US who orchestrated
various ‘color revolutions’, ‘Arab spring’, etc.*must be deemed morally impermis-
sible as it violates all four constraints developed and defended here and because
it feigns respect for the primacy of local activism: while it is the local people
that participate in a non-violent movement directed against their government, the
movement itself is envisaged, funded, and its ‘local’ leaders are trained by foreign
organizations.
TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM
In this essay, I have challenged the self-image and portrayal of international activism,
as something that in advance must be considered as (morally) good. By formulating
constraints on practices that, if satisfied, would render them morally permissible in
the context of international engagements, we obtain tools for both making and
defending judgments about the normative nature of those practices. Additionally,
with the resulting principle of the normative primacy of local activism we obtain the
basis for assessing the legitimacy of various practices by individuals and organizations
when acting abroad for ostensibly altruistic reasons.
The four constraints on the morality of international activism are derived from
different ideas: the Professionalism Constraint is based on an analysis of the altruistic
motivation; the Integrity Constraint is developed in opposition to the notion of
activists serving as force multipliers; the Respect for Sovereignty Constraint comes
from a comparative study of historical uses of ‘human rights’ favoring only ‘soft’
intervention; and the Humility Constraint emerges from the moral phenomenology
of international activism, once it is recognized that the attitude of epistemic
arrogance must be resisted by the international activists themselves. While the ideas
of altruism, force multiplication, human rights, and epistemic arrogance are very
much distinct notions each is closely connected to the context and practice of
international activism (as demonstrated above) and together they offer a basis for
constructing a framework for morally assessing what these activists do or have done,
as the examples used in this essay illustrate.
Furthermore, each of the constraints could be defended from a basic deontological
normative standpoint that demands respect for autonomy of persons and prohibits all
manipulation. The prohibition contained in the Professionalism Constraint against
acteurs engage´s acting on behalf of any government, ideology, corporation, or religion
is meant to secure an honest representation of the agent’s altruistic motivation to
which recipients of the aid can in fact (and not just in principle) consent. By contrast,
the Integrity Constraint safeguards the autonomy of the activists themselves,
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prohibiting them to consent to, and demanding that they guard against, their own
instrumentalization (which amounts to their own reification) for the sake of purposes
external to their aid or other altruistic contexts in general. The Respect for
Sovereignty Constraint, by commanding at most support of and solidarity with
locally pre-existing (domestic) causes and movements, achieves simultaneously both
of these moral goods; by proscribing all manipulation (in terms of goal setting and
methodology of their pursuit) affecting activists and beneficiaries of their engage-
ment, it ensures that international activists are acting autonomously and beneficiaries
are consenting. Finally, the Humility Constraint imposes on activists the attitude of
self-respect by demanding that they be honest with themselves about their goals,
methods, and motivation, thus precluding that they themselves become victims of
ideologically based epistemic arrogance; but, since respect is a symmetrical relation,
self-respect will command respect of others as well, especially those who find
themselves on the receiving end of one’s other-regarding pursuits.
International activists themselves have much to gain were they to follow these
constraints, which culminate in the principle of the primacy of the local activism
offering a clear demarcation line between legitimate activism and those that are not.
While these constraints and the resulting normative framework provide a basis for
evaluative assessment of the work activists do abroad, this framework can also serve
as a proper foundation for developing a responsible professional ethics (a code of
conduct) of international activism, and means of reflexivity for both activists and
scholars of activism, which must involve a double historicization: a historicization of
both what activists have done and accomplished over a period of time and of the
scholarly (or any other, say, ideological) construction of that activism. I shall
conclude by explicating this point.
Given that the rules governing one’s professional conduct differ in their character
substantially from the nature of moral rules, in order to explain the relationship
between the two kinds of rules we must distinguish between three normative orders:
moral, legal, and political. Namely, normative words like ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘permis-
sible’, ‘impermissible’, ‘just’, ‘unjust’, and so on, can be used to express moral, legal,
or political judgments. Thus, one might assert that infidelity is (morally) wrong, that
abortion is (legally) permissible where they live, or that choosing to build a joint
gravesite for both victims and perpetrators of the WWII massacres is (politically)
wrong. Ideally, the three normative orders would be so organized that the moral
order would enjoy the widest scope and contain both the legal and political orders,
while the legal order would be wider than the political. This would make every
(relevant) law (or a rule governing professional ethics) moral and every political
decision both legal and moral. Of course, real life is very different than this, but it is
in part precisely because of the ideal in question that moral deliberation is relevant
when decisions are made about what rules should constitute positive law or what
political course of action to take.
Furthermore, legal rules (including more specifically rules defining one’s profes-
sional ethics) and those used to set the course of any policy are conventions, they are a
result of somebody saying so, whether the mechanism that expresses such ‘legislative
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will’ is democratic or not. Moral rules, however, are not conventions*a simple result
of someone saying so48*and thus can serve as a basis for assessing the moral
character of rules (and ensuing practices) included on the list of positive laws or
postulated as governing one’s professional conduct (be it as a lawyer, medical doctor,
or international activist). Thus the self-monitoring by activists is made possible,
which could in principle lead to unmasking of power and ideology driving the
engagement that in some cases may render that reality (morally) inacceptable (as a
result of application of the constraints here developed), and thus inevitably call
for action in amending the modes of continued engagement (if not mandating
withdrawal). They have to know what they have done before they can know what
they are in fact doing, especially normatively speaking.49
However, the same considerations that make this self-monitoring by activists
possible can also generate monitoring by any interested party, be they scholars
interested in, say, the morality or sociology of international activists, or for example
the governments in the countries where international activists are operating. By
engaging in this sort of reflexivity all interested parties will do their jobs better, and
with actual seriousness.
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